Abstract In 2011, Lindell proposed an efficient commitment scheme, with a non-interactive opening algorithm, in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. He recently acknowledged a bug in its security analysis for the adaptive case. We analyze the proof of the original paper and propose a simple patch of the scheme. More interestingly, we then modify it and present a more efficient commitment scheme secure in the UC framework, with the same level of security as Lindell's protocol: adaptive corruptions, with erasures. The security is proven in the standard model (with a Common Reference String) under the classical Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our proposal is the most efficient UC-secure commitment proposed to date (in terms of computational workload and communication complexity).
corruptions. These two schemes have commitment lengths of only 4 and 6 group elements respectively, while their total communication complexity amount to 14 and 19 group elements respectively. Their security relies on the classical Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in standard cryptographic groups. Fischlin, Libert and Manulis [FLM11] shortly after adapted the scheme secure against static corruptions by removing the interaction in the Σ-protocol using non-interactive Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08] . This transformation also makes the scheme secure against adaptive corruptions but at the cost of relying on the Decisional Linear assumption in symmetric bilinear groups. It thus requires the use of computationally expensive pairing computations for the receiver and can only be implemented over groups twice 1 as large (rather than the ones that do not admit pairing computations).
Contributions of the paper. Recently, Lindell edited the ePrint version of his paper [Lin11b] , to signal a bug in the original proof of the protocol design for adaptive corruptions. While there is no known detail on this bug, we detail on this paper a possible inconsistency on the binding property of the scheme. In order to avoid the above concern, we propose a simple patch to Lindell's scheme making it secure against adaptive corruptions.
However, our main contribution is on improving both Lindell's commitment schemes [Lin11a] . As mentioned above, the committer encrypts the value m (encoded as a group element) using the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] . In the opening phase, he simply reveals the value m and uses a Σ protocol to give an interactive proof that the message is indeed the one encrypted in the ciphertext. In Lindell's schemes, the challenge in the Σ protocol is sent to the committer using a "dual encryption scheme". Our improvement consists in noting that the receiver can in fact send this challenge directly without having to send it encrypted before. With additional modifications of the schemes, we can present two new protocols secure under the DDH assumption in the UC framework, against static and adaptive corruptions. Both schemes require a smaller bandwidth and less interactions than the original schemes:
-Static corruptions: the scheme requires the communication of 9 group elements and 3 scalars, where Lindell's original proposal requires 10 group elements and 4 scalars. The commit phase is non-interactive and the opening phase needs 3 rounds (instead of 5 in Lindell's scheme). -Active corruptions: the scheme requires the communication of 10 group elements and 4 scalars, where
Lindell's original proposal requires 12 group elements and 6 scalars. The commitment phase needs 3 rounds (instead of 5 in Lindell's scheme) and the opening phase is non-interactive.
Implemented on suitable elliptic curves over 256-bit finite fields, our schemes provide a 128-bit security level with a communication complexity reduced to only 3072 and 3584 bits respectively (see Table 1 Outline of the Paper. We start by reviewing the standard definitions, in Section 2. We then present the original Lindell's commitment schemes in Section 3, followed by an explanation of a possible inconsistency and a simple correction.
Section 4 focuses on improving the original protocols. We will show how to reduce both the number of rounds and the number of elements exchanged, in both schemes. We then provide complete security proofs under the same computational assumption as for the original schemes, namely the DDH assumption.
Definitions

Commitments
A commitment scheme C is defined by 3 algorithms:
-Setup(1 k ), where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme, implicitly given as input to the other algorithms; -Commit(m; r) produces a commitment c on the input message m ∈ M, using the random coins r $ ← R, and also outputs the opening information w; -Decommit(c, m; w) decommits the commitment c using the opening information w; it outputs the message m, or ⊥ if the opening check fails.
Such a scheme should be both binding, which means that the decommit phase can successfully open to one value only, and hiding, which means that the commit phase does not reveal any information about m. These two properties can be obtained in a perfect, statistical or computational way, according to the power an adversary would need to break them. But essentially, a perfectly binding commitment scheme guarantees the uniqueness of the opening phase. This is achieved by an encryption scheme, which on the other hand provides the computational hiding property only, under the IND-CPA security. A perfectly hiding commitment scheme guarantees the perfect secrecy of m.
Some additional properties are sometimes required. The first is extractability, for a perfectly binding commitment scheme. The latter admits an indistinguishable Setup phase that also generates a trapdoor allowing message extraction from the commitment. Again, an encryption scheme is an extractable commitment, where the decryption key is the trapdoor that allows extraction. The second one is equivocability, for a perfectly hiding commitment scheme. The latter admits an indistinguishable Setup phase that generates a trapdoor allowing to open a commitment in any way.
Universal Composability Framework
The Universal Composability framework was introduced in [Can01] . The aim of the following is just to give a brief overview to have some common conventions.
In the context of multi-party computation, one wants several users P i with inputs x i to be able to compute a specific function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) without leaking anything except y i to P i . One can think about Yao's Millionaires' problem [Yao82] . Instead of following the classical approach which aims at listing exhaustively all the expected properties, Canetti did something else and tried to define how a protocol should ideally work: what are the inputs, and what are the available outputs. For that, he specified two worlds: the real world, where the protocol is run with some possible attacks, and the ideal world where everything would go smoothly, and namely no damage can be done with the protocol. For a good protocol instantiation, it should be impossible to distinguish, for an external player, the real world from the ideal one.
In the ideal world there is indeed an incorruptible entity named the ideal functionality, to which players can send their inputs privately, and then receive the corresponding outputs without any kind of communication between the players. This way the functionality can be set to be correct, without revealing anything except what is expected. It is thus perfectly secure. A protocol, in the real world with real players and thus possibly malicious players, should create executions that look similar to the ones in the previous world. This is to show that the communications between the players should not give more information than the description of the functionality and its outputs.
As a consequence, the formal security proof is performed by showing that for any external entity, that gives inputs to the honest players and gets the outputs but that also controls the adversary, the executions in the two above worlds are indistinguishable. More concretely, in order to prove that a protocol P realizes an ideal functionality F, we consider an environment Z which can choose inputs given to all the honest players and receives back the outputs they get, but which also controls an adversary A. Its goal is to distinguish in which Fmcom with session identifier sid proceeds as follows, running with parties P1, . . . , Pn, a parameter 1 k , and an adversary S:
-Commit phase: Upon receiving a message (Commit, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x) from Pi where x ∈ {0, 1} polylogk , record the tuple (ssid, Pi, Pj, x) and generate a public delayed output (receipt, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) to Pj. Ignore further Commit-message with the same (sid, ssid).
-Reveal/decommit phase: Upon receiving a message of the form (reveal, sid, ssid) from party Pi, if a tuple (ssid, Pi, Pj, x) was previously recorded, then generate a public delayed output (reveal, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x) to Pj. Ignore further reveal-message with the same (sid, ssid) from Pi.
Figure1. Ideal Functionality Fmcom of Commitment
case it is: either the real world with concrete interactions between the players and the adversary, or the ideal world in which players simply forward everything to and from the ideal functionality and the adversary interacts with a simulator S to attack the ideal functionality. We have to build a simulator S that makes the two views indistinguishable to the environment: since the combination of the adversary and the simulator cannot cause any damage against the ideal functionality, this shows that the adversary cannot cause any damage either against the real protocol.
The main constraint is that the simulator cannot rewind the execution as often done in classical proofs, since it interacts with an adversary under the control of the environment: there is no possible rewind in the real word, it is thus impossible too in the ideal world.
The adversary A has access to the communication but nothing else, and namely not to the inputs/outputs for the honest players. In case of corruption, it gets complete access to inputs and the internal memory of the honest player, and then gets control of it.
Ideal Functionality of Commitment
The ideal functionality of commitment is presented on Figure 1 . It is borrowed from [Lin11a, Can05] , where a public delayed output is an output first sent to the adversary S that eventually decides if and when the message is actually delivered to the recipient. In case of corruption of the committer, if this is before the receipt-message for the receiver, the adversary chooses the committed value, otherwise it is provided by the ideal functionality, according to the Commit-message.
Useful Primitives
Hash Function Family. A hash function family H is a family of functions H K from {0, 1} * onto a fixlength output, either a bitstring or Z p . Such a family is said to be collision-resistant if for any adversary A on a random function H K $ ← H, it is hard to find a collision. More precisely, this means that
Pedersen Commitment. The Pedersen commitment [Ped92] is an equivocable commitment:
-Setup(1 k ) generates a group G of order p, with two independent generators g and ζ; -Commit(m; r), for a message m $ ← Z p and random coins r $ ← Z p , produces a commitment c = Ped(m, r) = g m ζ r , while r is the opening information; -Decommit(c, m; r) outputs m and r, which opens c into m, and allows the validity test c
This commitment is computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assumption: two different openings (m, r) and (m , r ) for a commitment c, lead to the discrete logarithm of ζ in basis g. On the other hand, with this discrete logarithm value as additional information from the setup, one can equivocate any dummy commitment, when the input and opening values are known.
Cramer-Shoup Encryption. The Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] is an IND-CCA version of the ElGamal encryption. By merging the Setup and KeyGen algorithm into a unique Setup algorithm, we make it into an extractable commitment scheme CS, where dk is the extraction key, and r is the witness for the opening.
p , and sets c = g
2 , and h = g z 1 . It also chooses a Collision-Resistant hash function H K in a hash family H (or simply secondpreimage resistant). The encryption key is ek = (g 1 , g 2 , c, d, h, H K ).
We have a CRS, consisting of (p, G, g1, g2, c, d, h, h1, h2) , where G is a group of order p with generators g1, g2; c, d, h ∈ G are random elements in G and h1 = g1 ρ and h2 = g2 ρ for a random ρ ∈ Zp. Intuitively, (p, G, g1, g2, c, d, h) is a Cramer-Shoup encryption key and (p, G, g1, g2, h1, h2) is the CRS of a dual-mode encryption scheme. Let G : {0, 1} n → G be an efficiently computable and invertible mapping of a binary string to the group.
The commit phase. Upon receiving a message (Commit, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x), where x ∈ {0, 1} n−log 2 (n) and sid, ssid ∈ {0, 1} log 2 (n)/4 , party Pi works as follows:
1. Pi computes m = G(x, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj). 2. Pi picks r $ ← Zp and computes C = CS(m; r), we will note ω the hash of the first three terms. 3. Pi sends (sid, ssid, C) to Pj. 4. Pj stores (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, C) and outputs (receipt, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj).
Pj ignores any later commitment messages with the same (sid, ssid) from Pi.
The decommit phase. Upon receiving a message (reveal, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj), Pi works as follows:
Pi now computes z = s + εr and sends (sid, ssid, z) to Pj. (e) Pj outputs (reveal, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x) if and only if
, for a message M ∈ G and a random scalar r ∈ Z p , the ciphertext is C = CS(M ; r) = (u = (g r 1 , g r 2 ), e = M · h r , v = (cd ω ) r ), where v is computed afterwards with ω = H K (u, e). -Decrypt(dk, C): one first computes ω = H K (u, e) and checks whether the equality u The IND-CCA security can be proven under the DDH assumption and the fact the hash function used is collisionresistant or simple second-preimage resistant. This also leads to a non-malleable commitment scheme, that is additionally extractable when the Setup outputs the decryption key dk.
Lindell's Commitment Protocols
We now have all the tools to review the two original Lindell's commitment schemes [Lin11a] . The first variant can be found on Figure 2 . It only prevents static corruptions: the adversary can decide to run the protocol on behalf of a player, with its inputs, from the beginning, but cannot corrupt anybody when the execution has started. The second variant prevents adaptive corruptions with erasures.
Description of the Scheme for Adaptive Corruptions
It is presented on Figure 3 . The main difference from the static case is to move some proof from the decommit phase to the commit phase.
Discussion
Adaptive Corruptions. Lindell has proven both schemes secure under the DDH assumption, the former in details but a sketch of proof only for the latter. And actually, as noted by Lindell in the last version of [Lin11b] , the security against adaptive corruptions might eventually not be guaranteed. He indeed proves that no adversary can choose a message x beforehand, and do a valid commit/decommit sequence to x where the simulator extraction, at the end of the commit phase, would output an x different from
We have a CRS, consisting of (p, G, g1, g2, c, d, h, h1, h2, ζ, HK ), where G is a group of order p with generators g1, g2; c, d , h ∈ G are random elements in G and h1 = g1 ρ and h2 = g2 ρ for a random ρ ∈ Zp; HK is randomly drawn from a collision-resistant hash function family H. Intuitively, the tuple (p, G, g1, g2, c, d, h, HK ) is a Cramer-Shoup encryption key, the tuple (p, G, g1, g2, h1, h2) is the CRS of a dual-mode encryption scheme, and the tuple (p, G, g, ζ) = is the CRS of a Pedersen commitment scheme. Let G : {0, 1} n → G be an efficiently computable and invertible mapping of a binary string to the group.
The commit phase. Upon receiving a message (Commit, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x), where x ∈ {0, 1} n−log 2 (n) and sid, ssid ∈ {0, 1} n and sends c = (g1 R g2 S , h1 R h2 S G(ε)) to Pi.
Pi picks s, k2
$ ← Zp and computes (α, β, γ, δ) = (g1 s , g2 s , h s , (cd ω ) s ). He then computes and sends c 2 p = Ped(HK (α, β, γ, δ); k2) to Pj. 6. Pj now opens c by sending (R, S, ε) to Pi. 7. Pi checks if this is consistent with c otherwise he aborts. 8. Pi now computes z = s + εr, and erases r, s.
He also opens c The decommit phase. Upon receiving a message (reveal, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj), Pi works as follows:
1. Pi sends (x, α, β, γ, δ, k2, z) to Pj. 2. Pj computes m = G(x, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj), and outputs (reveal, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x) if and only if c 2 p is consistent and:
Figure3. Lindell's Commitment Protocol, UC-Secure against Adaptive Adversaries
x . However this is not enough as an adversary could still do a valid commit/decommit sequence to x where the simulator extraction at the end of the commit phase would output an x different from x . The difference between the two experiments is how much the adversary controls the value x : in the former x has to be chosen beforehand, while in the latter x is any value different from x. We describe, on top of Figure 4 , such a situation in which the adversary A plays as P i , and makes the simulator extract the value x, while in fact committing (or actually opening) to another value x , but that is too late when the simulator discover the mistake. For the sake of clarity, we only mention the differences between this situation and the real protocol presented on Figure 3 .
Any extraction done on C at the end of the commit phase would lead the simulator to believe to a commit to x, however the valid decommit outputs x . Note however that this attack does not succeed very often since one needs, for a random ε, that G −1 (mD 1/ε ) exists and can be parsed as (x , sid, ssid, P i , P j ).
Static Corruptions. We stress that this possible inconsistency comes from the move forward of the proof in the commit phase, even before the message x is strongly committed. The first protocol does not suffer from this issue.
A Simple Patch
In order to avoid the above concern, a simple patch consists in committing m = G(x, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) in the second Pedersen commitment c 2 p . This leads to the simple change in the protocol presented on the bottom part of Figure 4 , where x is now strongly committed before the proof, and then the previous issue does not occur anymore.
Our Optimization of the Commitments Protocols
We now focus on much more efficient protocols, with the above modification, and additional ones. We kept the original notations, but as done in [BBC + 13], we can note that C is actually a Cramer-Shoup encryption of m, and (α, β, γ, δ) is a partial Cramer-Shoup encryption of 1 with the same ω as in the first ciphertext: the double Cramer-Shoup encryption of (m, m ) was denoted by DCS(m, m ; r, s) = (C 1 , C 2 ), where
The commit phase. Upon receiving a message (Commit, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x) where x ∈ {0, 1} n−log 2 (n) and sid, ssid ∈ {0, 1} log 2 (n)/4 , A works as follows:
A then computes and sends c 2 p = Ped(HK (α, β, γ, δ); k2) to Pj. 8. A checks if G −1 (mD 1/ε ) exists and can be parsed as (x , sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) for a random x . If so, A now computes z = s + εr, and erases r, s. It also opens c 1 p by sending C, k1 to Pj.
The decommit phase. Upon receiving a message (reveal, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj), A works as follows: sends (x , α, β, γ, δ, k2, z) to Pj. 2. Pj computes m = G(sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x), and outputs (reveal, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x ) if and only if c 2 p is consistent and:
The commit phase.
Pi picks s, k2
$ ← Zp and computes (α, β, γ, δ) = (g1 s Figure 3 -C 1 is a real Cramer-Shoup encryption C 1 = CS(m; r) of m for a random r
, where v 2 is computed directly with the above
In addition, when ω is fixed, we have an homomorphic property: if (C 1 , C 2 ) = DCS(m, m ; r, s), with a common ω, the component-wise product C 1 × C 2 = PCS(m × m ; ω, r + s). In particular, we can see the last tuple (αu ε 1 , βu ε 2 , γe ε , δv ε ) as C 2 × C ε 1 . It should thus be PCS(m ε ; ω, εr + s) = PCS(m ε ; ω, z), which is the final check. We now use these new notations in the following.
Improvement of the Static Protocol
The improvement presented below consists in noting that the receiver can directly send the value ε in the decommit phase, without having to send a commitment first. To allow this, we simply ask the sender to send a Pedersen commitment of C 2 = (α, β, γ, δ) prior to receiving ε. This reduces the number of flows of the decommit phase (from 5 downto 3) and the number of elements sent by the receiver, (from 2 group elements and 3 scalars down to only 1 scalar, the challenge), simply increasing the number of elements sent by the sender by 1 group element and 1 scalar (the Pedersen commitment).
Sketch of Proof of the Static Protocol
For lack of space, we do not give here the full proof of the protocol. One may note that it is very similar to the one given in [Lin11a] . The only change lies in the decommit phase, where we make the receiver directly send his challenge value ε rather than encrypting it first. But this change is made possible by the sender sending a Pedersen commitment c 2 p of C 2 before having seen ε, as in the commit phase of the adaptive version of our protocol.
The proof can thus be easily adapted from the one given for our adaptive protocol (see Section 4.4). The only difference is that in the static version, the sender does not commit to his value C 1 , so that the simulator cannot change its mind on the value it gave inside this ciphertext later on. But one can note that in the proof of the adaptive protocol, this commitment c 1 p has to be equivocated only in case of adaptive corruptions (if the latter occur before the adversary has sent ε). This yields to the same simulator as in the adaptive case (see Section 4.5) with the following modifications, when P i is honest only:
Commit stage: Exactly as in the adaptive case except there is no corruption to deal with. Decommit stage: Upon receiving the information that the decommitment has been performed on x, with (reveal, sid, ssid, P i , P j , x) from F mcom , S first chooses a random z and computes the ciphertext C 3 = PCS(m; ω, z). It then chooses a random k 2 , a random C 2 , computes the associated Pedersen commitment c 2 p and simulates the first flow of the decommit phase to P j . Upon receiving ε from P j , it then adapts C 2 = C 3 /C 1 ε and uses the trapdoor for the Pedersen commitment to produce a new value k 2 corresponding to the new value C 2 . It then simulates the third flow of the decommit phase to P j .
Improvement of the Adaptive Protocol
As for the static version of the protocol, the main improvement presented on Figure 6 below consists in noting that the receiver can directly send the value ε, without having to send an encryption before. To allow this, we simply ask the sender to send his two Pedersen commitments prior to receiving ε.
This reduces, in the commit phase, the number of rounds (from 5 downto 3) and the number of elements sent by the receiver (from 2 group elements and 3 scalars down to only 1 scalar, the challenge). Contrary to the static version, there is no additional cost. This is illustrated in Section 5, which sums up the differences between Lindell's protocol and ours, in the same setting: UC-security against adaptive corruption with erasures.
In addition, in order to slightly increase the message space from n − log 2 (n) to n, we move the sensitive prefix (sid, ssid, P i , P j ) into the second Pedersen.
Eventually, in order to definitely exclude the security concerns presented in Section 3.2, we include the value m to the second Pedersen to prevent the adversary from trying to open his commitment to another value.
Security Proof
We now provide a full proof, with a sequence of games, that the above protocol emulates the ideal functionality against adaptive corruptions with erasures. This sequence starts from the real game, where the adversary interacts with real players, and ends with the ideal game, where we have built a simulator that makes the interface between the ideal functionality and the adversary.
As already explained, we denote by C 3 = C 2 C 1 ε , the tuple involved in the last check. It should be a partial encryption of m under randomness z = s + εr: C 3 = PCS(m; ω, z) where ω is the hash value of the first three terms of C 1 .
This is the real game, in which every flow from the honest players is generated correctly by the simulator which knows the input x sent by the environment to the sender. There is no use of the ideal functionality for the moment.
Game G 1 : In this game, we focus on the simulation of an honest receiver interacting with a corrupted sender. Executions with an honest sender are still simulated as before, using the input x. The simulator will generate the CRS in such a way it knows the Cramer-Shoup decryption key, but ζ is a discrete logarithm challenge.
We have a CRS, consisting of (p, G, g, g1, g2, c, d, h, ζ, HK ), where G is a group of order p with generators g, ζ, g1, g2; c, d , h ∈ G are random elements in G; HK is randomly drawn from a collision-resistant hash function family H. Intuitively (p, G, g1, g2, c, d, h, HK ) is a Cramer-Shoup public key and (p, G, g, ζ) is a CRS for a Pedersen commitment. Let G : {0, 1} n → G be an efficiently computable and invertible mapping of a binary string to the group, as before. The commit phase. Upon receiving a message (Commit, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, x), party Pi works as follows, where x ∈ {0, 1} n and sid, ssid ∈ {0, 1} log 2 (n)/4 :
Thanks to the homomorphic property, the repaired C 2 is a correct ciphertext of 1, and the equivocation of the Pedersen commitment guarantees a correct opening. This game is thus perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.
In case a corruption of P i occurs before the decommit phase, the simulator anticipates the equivocation of c 2 p . Game G 3 : One can note that in the previous game, r is not used anymore to compute z. One could thus ignore it, unless P i gets corrupted before ε has been sent, since we should be able to give it. But in such a case, one can compute again C 1 knowing r and equivocate c 1 p . We then alter again the way the double Cramer-Shoup ciphertext is generated: (C 1 , C 2 ) = DCS(m , n; r, s), for random m and n. Everything remains unchanged.
The unique change is thus the ciphertext C 1 that encrypts a random m instead of m. One can run the IND-CCA security game, in an hybrid way, to show this game is indistinguishable from the previous one. To this aim, one has to show that the random coins r are not needed to be known, and that the challenge ciphertexts are never asked for decryption (where the decryption key here is replaced by an access to the decryption oracle, hence the IND-CCA security game). The former point has been discussed above. For the latter, we have shown that the value actually encrypted in C 1 by the corrupted sender is the value sent at the decommit phase, which would even break the one-wayness of the encryption. Hence, if such a replay happens, one knows that the decommit phase will fail.
In case of corruption of P i before receiving ε, Pedersen commitments only have been sent, and they can thus be equivocated with correct values (given by either the ideal functionality or the adversary). In case of corruption of P i after having received ε, one does has before, anticipating the equivocation of c 2 p . Game G 4 : This is the ideal game, in which the simulator works as described below: when P i is corrupted, one uses the decryption of C 1 to send the Commit query to the ideal functionality, when P i is honest one can wait for the receipt and reveal confirmations from the adversary to conclude the simulation of the real flows.
Description of the Simulator
Setup. The simulator generates the parameters, knowing the Cramer-Shoup decryption key and the Pedersen equivocation trapdoor.
When P i is honest.
Commit stage: Upon receiving the information that a commitment has been performed, with (receipt, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) from F mcom , S computes (C 1 , C 2 ) = DCS(m , n; r, s), for random m and n but then follows as P i would do. If P j is honest too, one just has to send a random ε.
In case of corruption of P i before receiving ε, one can equivocate c 1 p , otherwise one equivocates c 2 p , as explained below, in both cases using the value given either by the ideal functionality or the adversary, according to the time of the corruption. Decommit stage: Upon receiving the information that the decommitment has been performed on x, with (reveal, sid, ssid, P i , P j , x) from F mcom , S exploits the equivocability of the Pedersen commitment: it first chooses a random z and computes the ciphertext C 3 = PCS(m = G(x); ω, z). It then adapts C 2 = C 3 /C 1 ε and uses the trapdoor for the Pedersen commitment to produce a new value k 2 corresponding to the new value C 2 . It then simulates the decommit phase to P j .
When P i is corrupted and P j is honest.
Commit stage: Upon receiving (C 1 , k 1 ) from the adversary, S decrypts the Cramer-Shoup ciphertext C 1 and extracts x from G. If the decryption is invalid, S sends (Commit, sid, ssid, P i , P j , ⊥) to F mcom . Otherwise, S sends (Commit, sid, ssid, P i , P j , x). Decommit stage: S acts as a regular honest user P j from the incoming message of A on behalf of P i . In case of validity, send the query (reveal, sid, ssid).
Conclusion
As a conclusion, let us graphically present a comparison of the two protocols.
